Suppose you are the owner of a movie theater. There are two types of customers: students (denoted 's') and non-students (denoted 'rs'). You know if a customer is a student or non-student and sol you could potentially use price discrimination with selection by indiontors. The demand for movies for esch of these seganents is: Student: q x
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=20−2p x
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Non-student: q ns
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=15−p na
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a. (5 points) On a graph, plot the total demand curve and the corresponding marginal revenue curve if the two types of consumers are treated as one. b. Suppose that marginal coest =1 and that you can only set a single wriform prior. (a) (2 points) What is the optimal uniform price? (b) (2 points) What is the profit under uniform pricing? (c) (2 points) What is consumer surplus under uniform pricing? c. Continue to assume that marginal coest =1. You would now like to price discrinainate by setting a different price for students and for nom-students. (a) (2 points) What are the optimal prices for students and for non-students? (b) (2 points) What are the profits under price discrimination? (c) (2 point) How does the profit under price discrimination compare to uniform pricing? (d) (2 points) How does dead-weight-loss change between uniform pricing and price discrimination? (e) (2 points) How does consumer surplus change between uniform pricing and price discrimination? (f) (2 points) Briefly explain (in one or two sentences) using your results from (d) and (e) whether there is an equityeefficiency tradeoff when moving from uniform pricing to discrininatory pricing? d. Now, suppose that marginal cost =10 and assume that the monopolist can only set a single: wniform price in both markets. (a) (2 points) What is the monopolist's optimal price?