Eight friends have decided to go out together for lunch at a burger restaurant. They will split the bill equally. There are two items on the menu: (i) a regular burger that costs $4 and (ii) a deluxe burger that costs $8. Each friend feels that eating a regular burger is worth $5 while eating a deluxe burger is worth $6. Note that a regular burger is worth more than it costs ($5> $4) while a deluxe burger is worth less than it costs ($6 < $8). Deluxe burgers are obviously a bad deal-paying $8 for something that is only worth $6 but game theory predicts that, when eating together, all eight friends will splurge on deluxe burgers. Why will they all order deluxe burgers? When someone upgrades their order from "regular" to "deluxe," they get an extra dollar of value from the burger (it's now worth $6 to them instead of $5). When someone upgrades their order from "regular" to "deluxe," they only pay an extra 50 cents for it, since the additional $4 cost for the deluxe burger is split eight ways. Each individual has a motivation to order a deluxe burger even though, when everyone does this, they all wind up paying $8 for something that is only worth $6 to them. If one person in the group decided to order a regular burger, the total bill would fall from $64 to $60, causing everyone's individual bill to fall from $8 to $7.50. So, the person who ordered the regular burger would have to pay $7.50 for something that is only worth $5 to them, even worse than paying $8 for something that is only worth $6 This scenario is a prisoners' dilemma There is a bully who picks on all the kids in your class. When the bully is picking on someone else, what is true? You have two strategies to choose from; stand up in defense of the other kid or stand by and do nothing. Individually speaking, you and every other kid in class have a disincentive to stand up to the bully-he might start going after you instead. If no one stands up to the bully, the bully will never stop. Each player's dominant strategy is not to stand up to the bully, leading to a collectively bad outcome in which the bully is never stopped. This scenario is a prisoners' dilemma Every weekend, picnickers at a local park decide whether to throw away their trash. Individually speaking, each person is better off leaving their trash on the ground-it is a hassle to throw it away-but, if everyone were to do that, the park would be a mess. Choose which of the statements about this scenario are true This is a tragedy of the commons Each player's dominant strategy is to leave their trash on the ground everyone gets a worse outcome when they do what is best for themselves individually than if they each make a personal sacrifice to help others. This game is a prisoners' dilemma The Nash Equilibrium is a collectively bad outcome in which the park is a mess. ." By Suppose in the littering example, a neighborhood association put up posters urging picnickers to "Be A Good Neighbor: Throw Out Your Trash." emphasizing how "good neighbors" throw out their trash, such posters could cause people to start cleaning up after themselves because they want to feel like "good neighbors" and because they want to avoid being thought of as "bad neighbors." As long as these new feelings are strong enough to persuade everyone to clean up, everyone will be better off than before, because the park will be clean and people will feel good about themselves and their neighbors for behaving well. Which of the five game changers is described in the example above? Trust Cartelization Regulation Relationship Retaliation All of these make use of the same Game-changer except one. Which game changer is common to all but one of these? Tariq, "Oh my warriors, whither would you flee? Behind you is the sea, before, the enemy." Cortes, "As for me, I have chosen my part. I will remain here," Odysseus, "Bind me with a bond so fast that I cannot possibly break away." Forrest, "Git thar fust with the most men." Present Self, "I bought a weight-loss bond that Future-self can only cash if the diet is successful." Trust Relationship Retaliation Regulation Cartelization